Adversarial attacks on video recognition models have been explored recently. However, most existing works treat each video frame equally and ignore their temporal interactions. To overcome this drawback, a few methods try to select some key frames, and then perform attacks based on them. Unfortunately, their selecting strategy is independent with the attacking step, therefore the resulting performance is limited. In this paper, we aim to attack video recognition task in the black-box setting. The difference is, we think the frame selection phase is closely relevant with the attacking phase. The reasonable key frames should be adjusted according to the feedback of attacking threat models. Based on this idea, we formulate the black-box video attacks into the Reinforcement Learning (RL) framework. Specifically, the environment in RL is set as the threat models, and the agent in RL plays the role of frame selecting and video attacking simultaneously. By continuously querying the threat models and receiving the feedback of predicted probabilities (reward), the agent adjusts its frame selection strategy and performs attacks (action).
Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have achieved great success in a wide range of tasks [15, 21, 3] . Despite this fact, it is proved that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial samples [7] . Recent works have shown that adding a carefully crafted, small human-imperceptible perturbation to a clean sample can fool the DNNs, resulting in them to make wrong predictions with high confidence [1, 7] . Nowa- Figure 1 . An example of sparse black-box video attack with Reinforcement Learning (RL). The clean video (top) can be recognized correctly. The adversarial video (bottom) produced by our proposed method is mis-classified. Note that only one frame (greenred line annotation) is adaptively selected by the RL, and very small perturbations are added on the key frame. days, because more and more DNN models are deployed in various sectors with high-security requirements, the study of adversarial examples has aroused great attention. Due to many real-time video classification systems are also constructed based on the DNN models, it is crucial to investigate the adversarial samples for video models. On the one hand, video attacks can help researchers understand the working mechanism of deep models. On the other hand, adversarial samples facilitate various deep neural network algorithms to assess the robustness by providing more varied training data [22, 6] .
According to the article [11] , the current video attacking methods can be roughly divided into two classes. The first class is called dense attack which pollutes each frame in a video [16, 12] , and the second class is to firstly select some key frames, and then generates perturbations on these selected frames [22, 23] , called as sparse attack. Compared with the dense attack, the sparse attack is more reasonable because there are temporal interactions between adjacent frames in the video. Utilizing this relationship can help both reduce the adversarial perturbations and improve the efficiency of generating process. For the former advantage, Figure 2 . Overview of the proposed algorithm. We utilize reinforcement learning to jointly perform key frame selection and video attacks in the black-box setting. Please see the texts for details.
because the selected frames are the most important ones in a video, only adding a small perturbations on these frames can fool the threat model, leading to the reduction of adversarial perturbations on the whole video. For the second advantage, the selected key frames are usually sparse, compared with generating perturbations on the whole frames, the operation of dealing with a few frames is more efficient.
To better select key frames in the sparse attack, a heuristic black-box attacks on video recognition model is proposed [23] . They firstly propose a heuristic-based algorithm to evaluate the importance of each frame, and then select key frames by sorting the importance scores, finally, the black-box attacks are performed on the selected frames. However, there are no interactions between the attacking process and the selecting key frames in their method. We argue that key frame selection is not only relevant with the video itself, but also the feedback from threat models. The frame selection and video attacking should be mutual guidance and cooperation. The results of this way can produce more accurate key frames and smaller perturbations for adversarial videos.
To this end, we present a sparse black-box video attack method with Reinforcement Learning (RL) in this paper. Specifically, the environment in RL is set as the threat models, and the agent in RL plays the role of frame selecting and video attacking simultaneously. By continuously querying the threat models and receiving the feedback of predicted probabilities (reward), the agent adjusts its frame selection strategy and performs attacks (action).
Step by step, the optimal key frames are selected and the smallest adversarial perturbations are achieved.
Formally, for the agent, we use an LSTM-based network to measure the importance of each frame. Combined with Bernoulli, the adaptive key frames are selected. To perform the black-box attacks, the Natural Evolution Strategy (NES) [10] is utilized to estimate the gradient from the threat models, and then the adversarial videos are generated based on these gradients. For the reward, we design two kinds of functions, the one comes from the video itself. For example, the frames with big action changes will have the high confidence to be the key frames. The other one comes from the feedback of attacking threat models. Figure 1 shows an adversarial video generated by our proposed method. The insight is that if the frames with tiny perturbations will lead to a big drop of predicted probability, these frames will have the high confidence to be the key frames. Figure 2 overviews the proposed method. Our major contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We are the first time to use reinforcement learning to attack video recognition models in the black-box setting. The previous works aim to attack the reinforcement learning model. We are different from them.
• An algorithm is designed for selecting key frames from a video when attacking video recognition models, which is based on two factors including the visual features of the video itself and the feedback given by the threat model. Video attacking and key frame selecting are cooperated and guided by each other.
• Extensive experiments on two state-of-the-art video recognition models and two benchmark video datasets show that the proposed method can generate adversarial videos with few perturbations. It also demonstrates that attacking on sparse video frames has a better effect than attacking on each video frame.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the related work. The proposed algorithm is described in Section 3. The experimental results and analysis are presented in Section 4. Finally, we summarize the conclusions in Section 5.
Related Work
Adversarial Attack on Video Models: Adversarial attacks on images have been extensively studied. In the past years, adversarial attacks have been extended to video data. An l 2,1 -norm regularization based optimization algorithm is the first method which is proposed to compute the sparse adversarial perturbations for video recognition [22] . The 3D universal perturbation [16] is generated by Generative Adversarial Networks offline and then used with unseen input for the real-time video recognition model. Unlike such white-box attack algorithms which need some knowledge about the video recognition models, Jiang et al. utilize tentative perturbations and partition-based rectifications to obtain good adversarial gradient estimates and high attack success rate in the black-box setting [12] . But attacking on all frames of the video would cause more perturbations and poor robustness of the adversarial video. Another black-box method is proposed by Wei et al. [23] , they heuristically search a subset of frames and the adversarial perturbations are only generated on those selected frames, but the processes of attacking and key frames selection are separated from each other, the perturbations of adversarial videos are still unsatisfactory.
Unlike the algorithms mentioned above, our method generate adversarial perturbations on the key frames which are selected by an agent that trained using visual features of the video and the feedback of attacking. Our method could generate smaller adversarial perturbations than state-of-the-art black-box video attack methods.
Deep Reinforcement Learning: Deep reinforcement learning is originally designed for learning and mimicking human decision-making processes, which aims to enable the agent to make appropriate behaviors according to the current environment through continuous interaction with the environment [17] . It doesn't require any supervisory information unlike supervised machine learning methods, but rather receives a reward signal to evaluate the performance of the action. Reinforcement learning has received a lot of attention since the alpha go beat human go masters. Computer vision tasks have also benefited from deep reinforcement learning in recent years. For example, Zhou et al. have applied deep reinforcement learning to train a summarization network for video summary [25] . Dong et al. use reinforcement learning for action recognition [5] . The process of discarding some irrelevant frames is a kind of hard attention mechanism in their method. Besides, it has been applied in some other fields like tracking, segmentation and person search [17] .
However, there is no example that deep reinforcement learning is applied in generating adversarial examples. Reinforcement learning algorithms have similar implementation mechanisms with adversarial attack algorithms especially black-box attack algorithms. It is the first time that we attempt to apply reinforcement learning to video blackbox adversarial attacks. An agent is designed to select key frames while attacking a video using a novel reward function. The key frames selection and adversarial attack are mutual guidance and cooperation in the whole attacking process.
Methodology
Sparse black-box video attack with reinforcement learning is described in this section. The threat models follow the query limited black-box settings. The adversary takes the video classifier F(·) as a black-box oracle and only has access to its output of the top-1 class and its probability. Specifically, F(x) takes a clean video x ∈ R T ×W ×H×C as an input and output the top-1 class y and its probability P (y|x), where T, W, H, C denote the number of frames, frame width, frame height, and the number of channels respectively. The true class label of the clean video is
where Cl s is the number of classes. The adversarial attack aims to find an adversarial example x adv can make F (x adv ) = y in the un-targeted attack or F (x adv ) = y adv in the targeted attack with the targeted adversarial class y adv , while keeping the adversarial example x adv satisfying the condition: x adv − x ρ ≤ adv , where adv is the bound of the perturbation , the ρ in L ρ -norm can be set 1,2,∞.
Video Attacking
The attack algorithm in our method is built based on fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [7] , which is originally designed for image models. It is defined as:
where α is the step size. sign(.) is sign function. l adv (x) is abbreviated for adversarial loss function l(F (x), y), which is described with l adv (x) = −l(F (x), y) in un-targeted attack and l adv (x) = l(F (x), y adv ) in targeted attack.
x l adv (x) is the gradient of the adversarial loss. Due to black-box settings, we cannot get the gradient from the threat model directly, NES [10] algorithm is used as gradient estimator in our method. For NES algorithm, it first generates n/2 values δ i N (0, I), i ∈ {1, 2...n/2}, where n is the number of samples. Then, it sets δ j = −δ n−j+1 , j ∈ {(n/2 + 1), ..n}. Finally, the gradient can be estimated as:
where σ is the search variance. We extend FGSM with NES from image models to video models. To deal with the high dimensional video data and improve the attack efficiency, the agent is used to select key video frames at beginning. Next, the initial perturbations of the key frames are generated by a white box attack on a pre-trained image model. Due to transferability of the adversarial examples, this approach can provide useful guidance for exploring space and help reduce the number of queries. Then, we gradually update the key video frames using FGSM until the attack succeeds or fails.
More specifically, for the targeted attack process, some key frames from a clean video are replaced with the corresponding frames of the target video (e.g. x 0 = x and F (x ) = y adv ) and then the perturbation bound is gradually reduced from 1(for normalized inputs x ∈ [0, 1]) to adv while keeping the targeted class as the top-1 class. For the un-targeted attack, some key frames of an original clean example are selected as victims and the perturbations are added until the attack succeeds or fails.
Key Frames Selection
Videos have successive frames in the temporal domain, thus, we consider to search key frames that contribute the most to the success of an adversarial attack. In our approach, key frames selection is considered as a one step Markov decision process. Figure 2 provides a sketch map of this process. The agent, interacting with an environment which provides the rewards and updating its actions, learns to select the frames by maximizing the total expected reward.
The input of the agent is a sequence of visual features of the video frames {v t } T t=1 with the length T. The agent is a bidirectional Long-Short Term Memory network (BiL-STM) topped with a fully connected (FC) layer. The BiL-STM takes as input the entire visual features {v t } T t=1 and produces corresponding hidden states {h t } T t=1 . We use the ResNet18 [9] to extract visual features and set the dimension of hidden state in the LSTM cell to 128 throughout this paper. Each h t contains both information from the forward hidden state h f t and the backward hidden state h b t , which is a good representation of the time domain information of its surrounding frames. The FC layer that ends with the sigmoid function predicts for each frame a probability p t , from which a frame-selection action a t is sampled:
where a t ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether the t th frame is selected or not. The reward reflects the quality of the action taken by the agent and contains two components in our method: the reward from inherent attributes of the video frames and the reward from the feedback of the threat model. The inherent attribute reward of frames include diversity reward R div and representative reward R rep [25] . Let the entire visual features be {x t } T t=1 and the indices of the selected frames be K = {k i |a ki = 1, i = 1, ..|K|}, the reward R rep and R div can be defined as:
where d(·, ·) is the dissimilarity function calculated by
The reward from the feedback of the threat model is defined as:
where Q is the number of queries, P is the mean perturbation of the adversarial video, 0.05 is a normalization factor, 0.999 is the penalty factor used for reducing the number of queries. The rewards R div , R rep and R attack complement to each other and work jointly to guide the learning of the agent:
Due to different rewards have different order of magnitude. The hyperparameters γ 0 , γ 1 and γ 3 are set as 1, 2, 3 in our experiments respectively. Since each frame corresponds to two actions, there are 2 T possible executions of a video, which is basically not feasible for deep Q learning. Thus, we employ the policy gradient method to make the agent learn a policy function π θ with parameters θ by maximizing the expected reward J(θ) = E p θ (a 1:T ) [R]. Following the REINFORCE algorithm proposed by Williams [24] , we approximate the gradient by running the agent for N episodes on the same video and then taking the average gradient:
where R n is the reward computed at the n th episode. The number of episodes N is set to 5 in our experiments. Although it is a good estimate, it may contain high variance which will make the network hard to converge. A common countermeasure is to subtract the reward by a constant baseline b, so the gradient becomes:
where b is simply computed as the moving average of rewards experienced so far for computational efficiency. We optimize the policy function's parameter θ via Adam [13] . We update θ as: θ = θ − ls θ (−J), where ls is learning rate.
Overall Framework
The whole process of the our method for the targeted attack is described in Algorithm 1, the epsilon decay is used to control the reduction size of the perturbation bound. The epsilon decay and FGSM step size α are dynamically adjusted as described in subsection 4.1. In the algorithm, φ(·) is the function to extract initial perturbations though a pre-trained ImageNet model like ResNet50 [9] . The zero vector M has a similar size with the input video and its some sub-vectors that the corresponding location is the location of key frames in the clean video x will be set to 1. The agent in the whole process of attacking is updated with the rewards' values, which is dynamical and interactive.
Experiments
In this section, two state-of-the-art video attack models are used to be compared with our proposed method on two video threat models with two public datasets. We focus on the overall perturbations and the length of the frames selected in our experiments. Furthermore, a variant of our method is designed to join comparisons. A comprehensive evaluation of our method will be presented on those threat models and datasets.
Experimental Setting
Datasets. Two widely used datasets, UCF-101 [19] and HMDB-51 [14] , are used in our experiments. UCF-101 is an action recognition dataset containing 13,320 videos with 101 action categories. HMDB-51 is a dataset for human motion recognition, which contains 51 action categories with a total of 7000 videos. Both datasets divide 70% of the video into training sets and 30% of the test sets. We randomly sample some videos from the test set of two datasets, and each sampled video can be classified by the threat models correctly. Similar to the method [23], 16-frame snippets evenly sampled from each video are used as input samples of the threat models during the evaluation.
Threat Models. In our experiments, Long-term Recurrent Convolutional Networks (LRCN) [4] and C3D [8] are used as threat models. The LRCN model uses Recursive x adv ← video of the target y adv 19 if y adv = T OP − 1(P (·| x adv )) then 20 x adv ← x adv Update Agent using the rewards 26 end 27 return x adv Neural Network to encode the spatio-temporal features generated by CNNs. In our implementation, Inception V3 [20] is used to extract the features of video frames, and LSTM is used for video classification; The C3D model uses 3D convolution to learn spatio-temporal features from video with spatio-temporal filter for video classification. These models are all mainstream methods for video classification. We use the same implementation with [23] . Table 1 summarizes the test accuracy of these two threat models with 16-frame snippets.
Metrics. Three metrics are used to evaluate the performance of our method on various sides. 1) Fooling rate (FR): the ratio of adversarial videos that are successfully misclassified. 2) Mean absolute perturbation (MAP): denotes the mean perturbation of each pixel in the entire video. A small value means the good imperceptibility. 3) Sparsity (S): represents the proportion of frames with no perturbations versus all frames in a specific video. It is defined as: S = 1 − m/T , where m is the length of the key frames. A large sparsity value means that only a few frames are added the adversarial perturbations. As mentioned in the introduction, this is more efficient than generating perturbations on the whole frames. Attack Setting. For the whole attacking process, it stops when it reaches a maximum number of epochs. For the first 20 videos, the maximum number is set to 20, and the learning rate is initialized as 10 −5 and decreases to its 1/10 after 15 epochs. After the first 20 videos, because the agent has become more intelligent, the maximum number is reduced to 1 and the learning rate is fixed to 10 −6 for the remaining videos. We set the maximum adversarial perturbations magnitude to = 0.05 per frame. The unit query limit, i.e., the maximum number of queries to the target model for each epoch is set to Q = 3 × 10 4 , which is a good balance between the total number of queries and the attack success rate. We run the attack until we find an adversarial example or the query limit is reached. For NES, we set the population size of each estimation as 48, which works well on different datasets in terms of the success rate or the number of queries. For search variance σ in NES, because the targeted attack needs to keep the target class in the list of top-1 classes to get the target class score, rather than the untargeted attack is to remove the current class from the top-1 position, we set it to 10 −6 for the targeted attack setting and 10 −3 for the un-targeted attack setting. The step size α adjust mode adopts the strategy in the article [18] . For the targeted attack, we adjust the step size α and epsilon decay dynamically. If the proportion of the adversarial examples cannot be maintained above the threshold 50%, the step size α is halved. If we can't reduce the perturbation size 100 times in a row, we cut the epsilon decay in half.
Comparing Algorithms
We compare our method with Opt-attack [2] and Heuristic-attack [23] . For Opt-attack, it is originally proposed to attack image classification models under black-box setting. The reason we select it as one competitor is that it can achieve smaller distortion compared with some other black-box attack algorithms. We directly extend Opt-attack to attack video models. For Heuristic-attack, it generates adversarial perturbation only on the selected frames. For parameter settings of these two algorithms, we use the same parameter settings as the original papers. Besides, one variant of our method, named SVAL, is joined to comparisons. For SVAL algorithm, we replace the R attack reward with the reward L percentage that used to limit the length of the key frames,
where S is the sparsity metric, a bigger S value, the fewer frames will be selected. Because it doesn't rely on any information about adversarial attacks, which can be regarded as a tool for selecting key frames and combined with other video attack algorithms easily. The SVAL algorithm only needs some videos to train the agent without any label information. So in different experiments, we first randomly select 50% videos to train agent, and then use the agent in our black-box attack method. We still optimize the policy function's parameter θ via Adam and update θ as: θ = θ − ls θ (−J R attack + βL percentage ), where J R attack means there is no reward R attack , and β is hyperparameter which is set to 1 in our experiments. The epochs of training is set to 20, and the learning rate is initialized as 10 −5 and decreases to its 1/10 after 15 epochs.
Performance Comparison
Because the parameter S in SVAL needs to be set, a grid search method is used to select appropriate parameters with different experiments. we here only show the sparsity tuning under the un-targeted attacks for C3D model. The tuning results are recorded in Table 2 . In the UCF-101 dataset, with the rising of sparsity, the fooling rate decreases. when FR is 100%, the smallest MAP is 3.2895. Therefore, we set S = 0.5 for the C3D model in the UCF-101 dataset in the following experiment. In the HMDB-51, with the rising of sparsity, the fooling rate keeps 100% for a long time. However, when the sparsity is more than 60%, some attacks have failed. Therefore we set S = 0.6 for the C3D model in the HMDB-51 dataset. The other sparsity settings, we use the same way to select the corresponding best results. The results of SVAL in Table 3 are achieved under the above corresponding settings. As shown in Table 2 , it can be found that attacking on a part of the video frames is a feasible and effective way to attack the video, which would significantly reduce the perturbations of the adversarial video. From the results of attacking on UCF-101 dataset, we can get that the threshold based approaches like SVAL have one bottleneck that the methods can only give a compromise result, and cannot give an optimal result for a specific sample. Therefore, as the sparsity of video increases, some video attacks will fail.
The comparison results between our methods and other attacking methods are listed in Table 3 in different tasks. The fooling rate in this table is 100%, and the corresponding MAP and sparsity is reported. In each task, the best performance is emphasized with the bold number.
For the un-targeted attack, the proposed methods SVAL and SVA have great advantages over other methods on the whole. On the MAP side, SVA ranks first in the 3/4 comparisons. The biggest gap between other algorithms and SVA occurs in C3D model with UCF-101 dataset, the MAP of SVA is only 1.7111, but others all exceed 3. There is only one case that our methods are not as effective as other methods, which is based on the LRCN model and UCF-101 dataset. The gap between SVA and the best method (Opt-attack) is very small, only 0.0367. On the sparsity side, SVAL and SVA are all ahead of the others, the sparsity generated by them all exceeds 50%. Two examples of the adversarial videos produced with our SVA un-targeted method are shown in Figure 3 . For the first example (above the black line), the ground-truth label is MilitaryParade, by adding the generated adversarial perturbations, the model tends to predict a wrong label BandMarching. For the second example (below the black line), the ground-truth label is flic flac, by adding the generated adversarial perturbations, the model tends to predict a wrong label kick ball. Besides, it can be found that the agent can select a small number of key and representative frames and the perturbations on the key frames are human-imperceptible.
For the targeted attack, the proposed algorithms are superior to other comparative methods in bath MAP and sparsity. SVA is at least 25% ahead in MAP and at least 85% ahead in sparsity. Two examples of the adversarial videos produced with our SVA targeted method are shown in Figure 4 . The clean video, adversarial video, and the corresponding perturbations are shown in the green box, red box, and grey box respectively. The perturbations are also rescaled into the range of 0-255. We display the video frames corresponding to the odd number of their coordinates in two adversarial videos, so only 8 video frames are shown for each video. For these two adversarial videos, the target classes of them are all Archery. The adversarial video above the black line is from UCF-101 with the threat model C3D, its original class is RopeClimbing. The MAP of this adversarial video is 5.4315, 62.5% of the total 16 video frames were polluted. The adversarial video below the black line is from UCF-101 with the threat model LRCN. Its original class is BodyWeightSquats. The MAP of this adversarial video is 1.479, the perturbations exist in 8 video frames with a total of 16 frames. As you can see, the sparsity of the adversarial video is generally lower than the results of un-targeted attack, which means targeted attack needs more frames to generate perturbations. From all the tables and figures where exist four adversaries produced by our proposed algorithm, we can obtain the following observations: (1) In the majority of test tasks, our SVA achieves the best performance, that demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed method. (2) Attacking on key frames is an effective way to reduce perturbations of Figure 4 . Two examples of the adversarial videos produced with our targeted attack. The clean video, adversarial video, and the corresponding perturbations are shown in the green box, red box, and grey box respectively. The perturbations have been rescaled into the range of 0-255. We display the video frames corresponding to the odd number of their coordinates in two adversarial videos, so only 8 video frames are shown for each video. For these two adversarial videos, the target classes of them are all Archery. The adversarial video above the black line is from UCF-101 with the threat model C3D, its original class is RopeClimbing. The MAP of this adversarial video is 5.4315, 62.5% of the total 16 video frames were polluted. The adversarial video below the black line is from UCF-101 with the threat model LRCN. Its original class is BodyWeightSquats. The MAP of this adversarial video is 1.479, the perturbations exist in 8 video frames with a total of 16 frames. adversarial video. (3) Mutual guidance and cooperation between Key frames selection and attacking is helpful to select the key frames for generating perturbations.
Conclusion
In this paper, a sparse black-box adversarial attack algorithm with reinforcement learning was proposed for video recognition models. Due to a large amount of temporal redundancy information of video data, we explored the sparsity of adversarial perturbations in the video frames through generating adversarial perturbations only on some key video frames. Considering that key frame selection was not only relevant with the video itself, but also the feedback from the threat models, an agent based on attacking interaction and video intrinsic properties was designed for identifying key frames while attacking. As the perturbations were generated only for the the selected frames, the proposed method could reduce the perturbations of adversarial examples significantly. In addition, the adversarial video generated by our method couldn't be easily invalid by random replacing one frame with one clean frame from the original video. Our algorithm was applicable to multiple target models and video datasets. Moreover, the experimental results demonstrated that video recognition models were vulnerable to adversarial attacks, and our algorithm achieved small human imperceptible perturbations. The most pertinent area of future work is to further investigate the black-box attack using fewer queries.
